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We estimate the effect of pension reforms on households' expectations of retirement outcomes and
private wealth accumulation decisions exploiting a decade of intense Italian pension reforms as a source of
exogenous variation in expected pension wealth. The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large
random sample of the Italian population, elicits expectations of the age at which workers expect to retire
and of the ratio of pension benefits to pre-retirement income between 1989 and 2002. We find that workers
have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform and that there is substantial offset
between private wealth and perceived pension wealth, particularly by workers that are better informed
about their pension wealth.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: H55; E21
Keywords: Expectations; Pension reform
1. Introduction
In all industrialized countries pension benefits represent a major component of retirement
income, and therefore social security arrangements can have important effects on households'
intertemporal choices. One of the most important issues in this area is to what extent individuals
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saving and labor supply in response to a reduction in pension benefits?
Answers to these questions usually proceed in two steps. In a first step, researchers estimate
expected pension wealth, that is, the expected present discounted value of future benefits that
workers are entitled to. In a second step, expected pension wealth is related to discretionary
wealth and/or labor supply behavior. Even in the simplest scenarios, estimating future pension
benefits is a difficult task. For the working population, expected pension wealth depends, among
other variables, on the age at which workers expect to retire and on the expected ratio of pension
benefits to pre-retirement earnings (the replacement rate). The standard approach taken in the
literature is to estimate these variables from current and projected legislation on pension eligibility
rules, accrual rates of contributions, productivity growth and mortality projections. In this paper
we instead take a different approach: we compute expected pension wealth by using individual
expectations of retirement age and replacement rate.
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), a large representative survey of the
Italian population carried out by the Bank of Italy, elicits retirement age and replacement rate
expectations from 1989 to 2002. This is not the only survey eliciting such expectations but, to our
knowledge, it is the only survey in which this information is available for an extended period
spanning a set of intense pension reforms. During the period, the Italian government enacted three
reforms (in 1992, 1995, and 1997), whose ultimate effect was to increase the retirement age and to
reduce the replacement rate of young workers relative to older cohorts.
The availability of individual expectations enables us to assess the degree of workers'
information by comparing the expected replacement rate to a replacement rate computed with the
relevant pension legislation (for a given retirement age). Moreover, the pension reforms that take
place in the observation period provide us with the opportunity to estimate the impact of these
reforms on individual expectations. In particular, we can analyze whether the groups most
affected by the reforms have perceived these changes correctly. Believing in the importance of
subjective expectations to determine individual decisions, we use subjective expectations of
retirement age and replacement rate to construct a measure of expected pension wealth and we
relate it to discretionary wealth. We then show that the relationship between expected pension
wealth and discretionary wealth differs according to the degree of individual information about
pension legislation and the changes implied by the reform.
The standard life-cycle hypothesis posits that a change in expected pension benefits should
offset private wealth one-for-one. This offset is what Feldstein (1974) calls the substitution effect
—pension wealth crowds out discretionary wealth. There are several potential counter-effects to a
complete crowding out. Bequest motives, short-sightedness, liquidity constraints, risk associated
with future reforms, and non-marketable future benefits are among the most cited reasons to
explain why the offset between private and pension wealth might well be less than one-for-one.
But there is another element that plays a major role in our analysis: individual information about
pensions. Information might be especially important at times of pension reforms, because people
might not immediately understand how the reform will affect their benefits or because changes in
expectations occur slowly.
Feldstein (1974) and Feldstein and Pellechio (1979) pioneered the analysis of the displacement
effect of pension wealth on national saving using U.S. time series and microeconomic data,
respectively. Since then, a growing literature has used individual level data to provide evidence on
the degree of substitution between discretionary accumulation and pension wealth in the U.S. and
other countries imputing pension wealth from legislation (see Gale, 1998; Bernheim, 2002).
Existing microeconometric evidence suggests that pension wealth crowds out discretionary
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looks at how pension entitlements affect retirement and labor participation decisions of the
elderly, and simulates the effects of policy reforms (see Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004).
Using SHIW data for the years 1989–1995, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) exploit the
changes in pension wealth across cohorts and employment groups induced by the 1992 Italian
pension reform. They model the response of the change in private wealth relative to income (the
saving rate) to the level of social security wealth relative to income. This amounts to assuming
that saving changes permanently when social security wealth changes. In the long run, this
implies a very large effect of a pension reform on private wealth.
In this paper, we take the standard approach and relate the level of private wealth (relative to
income) to the level of social security wealth (relative to income). We look at the combined
impact of three pension reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997) and rely on an estimate of pension wealth
based on the expected retirement age and expected replacement rate, rather than computed from
legislation.
Given the nature of our data, we are able to distinguish the effect of pension reforms on
workers' expectations, and the effect of expectation revisions on discretionary wealth. This
distinction proves to be an important one for estimating the offset between pension wealth and
discretionary wealth, since this offset is stronger among workers with more accurate expectations
of pension provisions than among those with less accurate expectations. In this sense, our
contribution adds significantly to the debate on individual savings decisions in relation to pension
reforms by highlighting the importance of information and expectation errors about pension
provisions. To the extent that expectations will eventually fully adjust to the new pension regime,
the offset estimated for the group of workers with more accurate expectations gives us an estimate
of the long run change in the stock of private wealth.
The paper is therefore also closely related to the literature that analyzes the accuracy of
subjective expectations of retirement age and social security benefits (see Bernheim, 1990;
Disney and Tanner, 1999; Dominitz et al., 2002; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). This literature
has been concerned with a set of issues, which are, to a large extent, preliminary to the analysis of
the effect of pension wealth on private wealth accumulation. Specifically, it analyses the degree of
workers' knowledge of retirement benefits they are entitled to, the relation between planned and
actual retirement age, and the determinants of the probability distribution of expected retirement
age.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the Italian pension reforms of the last
decade and discusses previous evidence. Section 3 presents the data on expectations of retirement
outcomes available in the 1989–2002 SHIW and estimates the impact of pension reforms on the
expected retirement age and replacement rate, exploiting the variation in the impact of the
legislation changes on different demographic and economic groups. We also evaluate the
accuracy of pension expectations by comparing the expected replacement rate with a statutory
rate. We find that, on average, the expectation error of the replacement rate is about 3 percentage
points, but for 14% of the sample the expected replacement rate underestimates or overestimates
the statutory rate by at least 25 percentage points. After the three pension reforms there has been
an increase in expectation errors, particularly for the groups most affected by the reforms.
Workers have revised expectations in the direction suggested by the reform, but the adjustment is
far from complete.
Section 4 relates discretionary wealth to a measure of expected pension wealth constructed
with expectation data. The empirical estimates suggest an offset between private wealth and
expected pension wealth of about 50%. This, however, results from considerable differences
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in the former group, and between −0.2 and −0.4 in the latter. Section 5 concludes by drawing
attention to the crucial role of financial information and suggesting that in the coming decades a
problem of inadequate savings could emerge for the cohorts most affected by the reforms and,
within this group, for those who are less informed about pension rules.
2. The Italian pension system: a decade of reforms
Until recently, the Italian social security system featured high replacement rates, earnings-
based benefits, indexation of pensions to real earnings and cost of living, generous provisions for
early retirement, and a large number of social pensions (i.e., old-age income assistance). These
features of the social security system were gradually implemented and extended during the post-
war period, and especially between 1967 and 1975. The result was that the ratio of pension
benefits to GNP reached almost 16% in 1992, the highest value among industrialized countries.
The late eighties and early nineties saw increasing alarm over the growing imbalance of the
social security system expressed not only by economists and in official government documents,
but also in the media. In the second half of 1992 the Amato government presented a fiscal package
containing a major reform of the social security system. In 1995 Italy underwent a second major
reform of the social security system, known as Dini reform. Social security legislation was further
refined in December of 1997 by the Prodi government.
The main features of the reforms were an increase in the retirement age and minimum years of
contributions for pension eligibility, abolition of seniority pensions for all those who started
working after 1995, a gradual reduction in pension benefits, and indexation of pension benefits to
prices rather than to wages. The three reforms maintained the generous provisions of the pre-1992
regime for the relatively old workers, who in 1995 had at least 18 years of contributions, and
different rules for private employees, public sector employees and self-employed.
Although the current regime combines some features of each of the three reforms, we do not
detail their specific aspects.1 In fact, we compare pension regimes and individual expectations
before the 1992 reform and after the 1997 reform, omitting the transitional years between the
Amato and Prodi reforms (1992–1997). Our data set allows us to observe workers in two regimes,
one with generous provisions (before the Amato reform, or simply the pre-reform period) and
one–10 years later–with much lower benefits (after the Prodi reform, or the post-reform period),
at least for some categories of workers. We regard the availability of low frequency
microeconomic data as a major improvement with respect to previous evidence.
The top panel of Table 1 compares statutory retirement ages in the pre-1992 regime with the
post-1997 regime. For brevity we refer to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in
1995 as the “old”, to those with less than 18 years of contributions in 1995 as the “middle-aged”,
and to those who started working after 1995 as the “young”. In the new regime the young are
entitled to a flexible retirement age (from 57 to 65), subject to incentives. For those already
working in 1995 (the old and the middle-aged), the reform raises minimum retirement age for old
age pensions of private sector employees (65 for men and 60 for women), but not for public
employees and self-employed. For the old and middle-aged, the reform raises minimum years of
contributions for both seniority pensions and old age pensions; for the young, whose pension
award formula is entirely contribution based (see below) the minimum years of contributions is
just 5 years.1 Brugiavini (1999) provides ample details on the specific features of the sequence of the three Italian pension reforms.
Table 1
Retirement age and pension award formula before and after the pension reforms
Retirement age
Old age pensions Seniority pensions
Minimum retirement age Minimum years
of contributions
Minimum years of
contributions
Private
sector
Public
sector
Self-
employed
Private
sector
Public
sector
Self-
employed
Pre-1992
regime
All
workers
60 (55) 65 (60) 65 (60) 15 35 20 35
Post-1997
regime
Old Progressively
rising to 65 (60)
65 (60) 65 (60) Progressively
rising to 20
40 before age 57 40 before
age 58
35 after age 57 35 after
age 58
Middle-
aged
Progressively
rising to 65 (60)
65 (60) 65 (60) Progressively
rising to 20
40 before age 57 40 before
age 58
35 after age 57 35 after
age 58
Young Subject to incentives: 57–65 5 Abolished
Pension award formula
Private sector Public sector Self-employed
Pre-1992
regime
All workers
Earnings model
2%×years of
contributions×average
of the last 5 years of
earnings
2.33%×years of
contributions×last year
of earnings
2%×years of
contributions×
average of the last
10 years of earnings
Post-1997
regime
Old
Earnings model
Gradually to 2%×years of
contributions×average of
last 10 years of earnings
Gradually to 2%×years of
contributions×average of
last 10 years of earnings
Gradually to 2%×
years of
contributions×
average of last
15 years of earnings
Middle-aged
Pro-rata model
Earnings model before 1995, contribution model after 1995.
Young
Contribution
model
Contributions (33% of gross wage for employees and 20% for self-employed) are
capitalized on the basis of 5-years moving average of GDP growth. The capitalized sum
is then multiplied by a coefficient that varies by retirement age, taking into account life
expectancy.
Old, middle-aged and young refer, respectively, to workers with more than 18 years of contributions in 1995, less than
18 years of contributions in 1995, and who start working after 1995. In the top panel female retirement age is reported in
parenthesis when different from males.
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regime and the post-1997 regime, which we detail here. In the pre-reform regime social
security benefits were computed according to an earnings-based formula, ρNw¯R, where ρ, N
and w¯R are, respectively, the accrual rate, the years of contributions and the average of the
last R years of salary.2 The shift to the new regime dramatically altered the pension award2 The accrual rate was 2% for private employees and self-employed, and ranged from 2.2% to 2.5% for public
employees, depending on the years of contribution. R was 5 for private employees, 1 for public employees, and 10 for the
self-employed.
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workers.
In the post-reform regime pensions are computed distinguishing between three cases: an
earnings model for the old, a contribution model for the young, and a pro-rata model for the
middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995). In each case, different rules apply to
public employees, private employees and self-employed.
For older workers, pensions are still computed using the earnings model, and are the sum of
two components. The first component is ρα92w¯R, where α92 is the number of years of
contributions at the end of 1992. The second component reflects a gradual increase of R to 10 for
private and public employees and to 15 for the self-employed.3 In practice, for realistic earnings
growth rates, the second component has a small impact on the final pension with respect to the
pre-reform regime.
For the young benefits are computed according to a contribution model, γτ∑0N−1wt(1+g)N−1−t,
where τ is the contribution rate and g a 5-year moving average of the GDP growth rate.
Contributions are proportional to earnings, capitalized on the basis of a 5-year moving average,
and then transformed in flow benefits using a coefficient (γ), set by legislators, that depends on
retirement age and life expectancy.4 Since the contribution rate τ is 33% for private and public
employees and 20% for the self-employed, in the new regime the self-employed will receive
substantially lower pensions than employees. The contributions-based model has identical
minimum retirement age for males and females, in both old age and seniority pensions. However,
the new regime applies only to the young cohorts, who entered the labor market after 1995, and
will presumably start to retire after the year 2030.
For the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995), pensions are computed
according to a “pro-rata model”: earnings-related for working years before 1995, and
contributions-related afterwards.
In Table 2 we provide an example showing how the replacement rate changed after the reform.
As explained in Table 1, retirement age is not mandatory in Italy, and replacement rates depend on
years of contributions. To compute replacement rates one therefore needs to make a particular
choice of retirement age. In the top panel of Table 2 we compute replacement rates for somebody
retiring at age 60, with 35 years of contributions. The example posits that the growth rate of
earnings is 2%, and that the aggregate GDP growth rate is 1.5%. We distinguish between three
categories of workers (private, public, self-employed), three cohorts (old, middle age, young) and
two periods (before and after the reform). The replacement rate is defined as the ratio of the first
year's pension to the last year's earnings.5
In the pre-reform regime the replacement rates were the same for old, middle-aged and young
workers, because the earnings model applied to all. However, in that regime replacement rates
differed considerably across occupational groups: 67.3% for private employees, 81.6% for public
employees and 64.1% for the self-employed. The higher rates for public employees reflect more5 We do not distinguish here between males and females. For given retirement age, they have the same pension accrual
formula.
3 Namely, for years of contributions between 1992 and 1995, R is increased by 1; for years of contributions between
1995 and the year of retirement, R is increased by a minimum of 5 and 2/3 of the years of contributions between 1995
and the year of retirement. For instance, for those retiring in 2000 R is increased by 3; for those retiring in 2005 it is
increased by 5. The second component is therefore ρ(α95−α92)w¯R′+ρ(N−α95)w¯Rʺ , where α95 is years of contribution at
end of 1995, R′=R+1 and Rʺ=R+min[5, int((2/3) × (N−α95))]. Therefore, the pension for the old is:
q a92 1− RR V
 þ a95 RR V− RRW þ N RRW w¯R.
4 Currently, γ increases from 4.720% for somebody retiring at 57 to 6.136% for somebody retiring at 65.
Table 2
The replacement rate before and after the pension reforms
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Retirement age: 60
Private employees
Old 67.3 66.3 −1
Middle-aged 67.3 58.2 −9.1
Young 67.3 54.9 −12.4
Public employees
Old 81.6 76.5 −5.1
Middle-aged 81.6 61.0 −20.6
Young 81.6 54.9 −26.7
Self-employed
Old 64.1 63.3 −0.8
Middle-aged 64.1 41.7 −22.4
Young 64.1 33.3 −30.8
Retirement age: 62
Private employees
Old 71.2 70.1 −1.0
Middle-aged 71.2 64.0 −7.1
Young 71.2 61.7 −9.4
Public employees
Old 86.2 81.2 −5.0
Middle-aged 86.2 66.9 −19.3
Young 86.2 61.7 −24.5
Self-employed
Old 67.8 66.9 −0.9
Middle-aged 67.8 45.2 −22.6
Young 67.8 37.4 −30.4
The replacement rate is computed on the basis of legislation and a given retirement age. In the post-reform regime, for the
“middle-aged” and the “young” the replacement rate is calculated on the assumptions that the growth rate of earnings and
aggregate GDP are 2% and 1.5% per year, respectively. In the top panel the retirement age is 60, and each worker
contributes for 35 years before retiring; in the post-reform regime, the “old” contributes 25 years before 1995 and 10 years
after, and the “middle-aged” 10 years before 1995 and 25 years after. In the lower panel, the retirement age is 62, and each
worker contributes for 37 years before retiring; in the post-reform regime, the “old” contributes 27 years before 1995 and
10 years after, and the “middle-aged” 10 years before 1995 and 27 years after.
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salary).
In the post-reform regime workers are distinguished according to the number of years of
contributions in 1995. In our example we still posit that each worker plans to retire after 35 years
of work, but distinguish between an old worker with 25 years of contributions in 1995, a middle-
aged worker with 10 years of contributions in 1995, and a young person who starts working in
1996. After the reform, the replacement rates of old private employees and self-employed are
practically unaffected (−1.0 and −0.8 percentage points), while that of old public employees falls
by 5.1 percentage points. This differential effect is largely due to the reduced accrual rate of public
employees (from 2.33% to 2%). In contrast, middle-aged and especially young workers
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percentage points for the middle-aged and −12.4 percentage points for the young; for public
employees, −20.6 and −26.7 percentage points, respectively; and for the self-employed −22.4
and −30.8 percentage points.
The example shows that the pension reforms reduced pension benefits for the middle-aged and
the young, and for all cohorts of public employees. The implied magnitudes of change are
substantial, as for some of the categories involved the replacement rate falls by over 20 percentage
points. Since the replacement rate is a function of the years of contributions, these magnitudes of
change are sensitive to the choice of retirement age.
In the lower panel of Table 2 we raise years of contributions and retirement age to 37 and 62,
respectively. The replacement rates are 4 to 5 percentage points higher for each of the groups
considered, although the changes after the reform are similar. In particular, old private employees
and old self-employed workers are basically unaffected by the reform. The Italian pension
reforms therefore provide a quasi-experimental framework to analyze the impact of reforms on
individual expectations. Since the reform affects some population groups (the middle-aged, the
young, and public employees) more dramatically than others (old private employees and old self-
employed), we will be able to compare the changes in expectations of different groups of
individuals before and after the reform.
3. Expectations of retirement outcomes
The life-cycle model of saving assumes perfect information and requires that individuals can
construct consumption and saving plans. The perfect information assumption is challenged on
several grounds. On the theoretical side, it has been argued that misinformation can explain some
of the empirical failures of the standard life-cycle model (Thaler, 1994). The available empirical
evidence for the U.S. shows that workers are not well informed about their pension benefits
(Bernheim, 1988; Mitchell, 1988; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989). This lack of empirical support
for the perfect information assumption motivates a series of studies on the determinants of
imperfect knowledge of retirement outcomes.
In general, the literature finds that expectations are informative about retirement outcomes, but
also uncovers substantial heterogeneity across the population and reveals that many workers lack
knowledge of the details of their pension plans. The earliest paper is by Bernheim (1990), who
compares retirement expectations and realizations in the U.S. Retirement History Survey and
finds that men and wealthier individuals make more accurate plans. Disney and Tanner (1999)
analyze expectations of retirement age in the U.K. Retirement Survey, and find that marital status
and education have a significant effect in explaining systematic deviations of expectations from
outcomes.6 Lusardi (1999) investigates the effect of unmeasured cost of planning on saving and
household portfolio choice and shows that households' wealth holdings are quite low before
retirement and badly diversified. Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) match data from the Health and
Retirement Study with administrative data, and quantify individuals' misinformation on social
security benefits. They find only a weak relation between expected retirement benefits and
benefits estimated on the basis of social security earnings records and employers' descriptions of
pension plans.6 The focus of the paper is on the distribution of actual retirement age, conditional on a given expected retirement age,
rather than on the overall distribution of expectations and realizations.
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expected retirement age and then use this information to focus on expected replacement rate,
defined as the expected ratio of the first pension to the last salary. For any given expected
retirement age, the replacement rate is a convenient summary indicator of the generosity of the
pension system and a good proxy for expected pension wealth.
The survey–the SHIW–is a large random sample of the Italian population drawn by the Bank
of Italy every 2 years. Sample design, interviewing procedure, response rates and a comparison
between sample and population means are reported in Appendix A (available in the online
version). The survey covers several important topics related to retirement and pensions and
collects data on the subjective assessment of expected retirement age and replacement rate. All
workers (public employees, private employees, self-employed) are asked the following questions:
• When do you expect to retire?
• Think about when you will retire, and consider only the public pension (that is, exclude private
pensions, if you have one). At the time of retirement, what fraction of labor income will your
public pension be?
In Italy less than 10% of the workers are covered by occupational pension schemes, so for the
overwhelming majority the social security replacement rate coincides with the overall
replacement rate. The first question is posed in each survey year from 1989 to 2002; the second
question only in 1989, 1991, 2000 and 2002. Since we are interested in studying workers'
expectations about retirement income, we focus on the group aged 20 to 50 years. This implies
that we include in our sample individuals born between 1939 (who were 50 years old in 1989) and
1982 (20 years old in 2002). The composition of the sample of older workers is likely to reflect
self-selection into higher expected retirement ages, and so these workers are dropped from the
analysis. A small number of individuals younger than 20 are also excluded (less than 1% of the
sample). We focus on how expectations change after the reform and therefore drop workers that
are interviewed in the transitional years.
We define as the pre-reform period the pooled 1989–1991 sample, while the post-reform
period is the pooled 2000–2002 sample. Finally, we consider only workers who are employed or
self-employed in the survey year, excluding the unemployed, retirees and other individuals not in
the labor force. Overall, we have valid responses on both expected retirement age and expected
replacement rate for 9724 males and 5925 females.
As explained in Section 2, the pension reform has different effects depending on whether
workers had contributed for more or less than 18 years at the end of 1995, and different again for
those who started working after 1995. The SHIW records the age at which individuals started
working. This allows us to compute the years of contribution at the end of 1995 for each worker
and to define our groups accordingly.87 Some studies focus on the subjective probability distribution of retirement outcomes, rather than on point
expectations of retirement age and benefits. Hurd and McGarry (1995) analyze the subjective probability distribution of
the chance of working full-time past age 62 and of living to age 75 in the U.S. Health and Retirement Study. Dominitz et
al. (2002) use the Survey of Economic Expectations, which elicits the subjective probability distributions of eligibility for
social security benefits and of the level of benefits. They report a high degree of uncertainty about future benefits even for
people only 10 years from retirement.
8 Our imputation procedure assumes no unemployment spells during the working life and is therefore subject to a
certain amount of measurement error. As a sensitivity check, we assume that each individual starts working and
contributing at age 20 (or 22) and define years of contribution as current age less 20 (or 22). These alternative definitions
do not affect any of our results.
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Table 3 displays expected retirement age by gender, three occupation groups, and cohort.
Males expect to retire 2 years later than females; the self-employed 3 years later than private or
public employees. Individuals in the middle-aged group have very similar expected retirement
age if working in the private or in the public sector, both before and after the reform. After the
reform, expected retirement age increases for all groups considered, and especially for females
and the middle-aged. No comparison is possible for the young, who are only observed after the
reform. The patterns suggest that workers most affected by the reforms understand the direction of
the changes that have taken place in the pension system.
Table 4 reports expected replacement rates for males and females in the various employment
groups and cohorts considered. On average, the rate is high for all groups, reflecting the generous
provisions of the Italian social security system. The expected replacement rates range from 65.3%
to 81.8% before the reform, and from 57.3% to 79.9% afterwards.
Before the reform, public employees display the highest expected replacement rate (for males,
81.8% for the old, and 80.6% for the middle-aged), reflecting more generous accrual rates for this
group. The self-employed, which is the group with the least generous pension award formula,
report the lowest replacement rates (for males, 69% for the old and 71.1% for the middle-aged).
On average, females expect a replacement rate between 2 and 3 percentage points lower than
males, consistent with shorter working careers.
After the reform, expected replacement rates fall for both males and females, and for all
employment groups considered. For males, the reduction for the middle-aged is stronger than for
the old, particularly for private employees (where the middle-aged show an 8.4 percentage points
reduction) and the self-employed (with a 12.2 percentage points reduction); these relatively large
downward revisions are consistent with the changes introduced by the pension reform.
Replacement rates also fall for females, but the difference between the old and the middle-aged is
not as large as that for males.Table 3
Expected retirement age: descriptive statistics
Males Females
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Private employees
Old 58.8 60.7 1.9 55.7 58.8 3.0
Middle-aged 59.8 62.3 2.6 56.4 60.1 3.7
Young 63.1 61.1
Public employees
Old 59.4 60.6 1.2 56.9 59.8 3.0
Middle-aged 59.5 62.2 2.7 56.7 60.8 4.1
Young 63.9 61.4
Self-employed
Old 62.1 63.1 1.0 59.0 60.4 1.4
Middle-aged 61.6 64.1 2.5 58.0 61.7 3.7
Young 64.3 61.8
Data are drawn from the 1989–2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989–1991, the post-reform period is 2000–2002.
The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, the
“young” entered the labor market after 1995.
Table 4
Expected replacement rate: descriptive statistics
Males Females
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Private employees
Old 79.2 74.9 −4.3 77.2 71.1 −6.1
Middle-aged 79.2 70.8 −8.4 76.9 70.0 −6.9
Young 67.9 67.2
Public employees
Old 81.8 79.9 −1.9 78.3 74.0 −4.3
Middle-aged 80.6 76.6 −4.0 78.3 72.8 −5.5
Young 73.9 69.1
Self-employed
Old 69.0 61.2 −7.8 65.3 57.3 −8.0
Middle-aged 71.1 59.0 −12.1 69.7 58.9 −10.8
Young 61.8 57.4
Data are drawn from the 1989–2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989–1991, the post-reform period is 2000–2002.
The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” less than 18 years of contributions in 1995, the
“young” entered the labor market after 1995.
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with their statutory levels. We know from Table 2 that statutory replacement rates depend on
retirement age, which is a choice variable. We therefore compute a “statutory rate” conditioning
on a reported expected retirement age. Thus, the statutory rates after the reform reflect not only
differences in pension rules across groups and pension regimes, but also the increase in retirement
age documented in Table 3. In order to compare individual expectations to their statutory
counterparts, in Section 3.2 we focus on the determinants of the expectation errors, defined as the
difference between expected and statutory replacement rates.
The second limitation is that differences over time in expected replacement rates capture not
only the effects of the reform but also other economy-wide phenomena. To compare expectations
before and after the pension reform, and to account for economy-wide factors potentially affecting
the various groups over time, in Section 3.3 we use a difference-in-difference methodology.
3.2. Expectation errors
Table 5 reports the statutory replacement rate evaluated at the average expected retirement age
for each employment, cohort, and gender group. The patterns in Table 5 are similar to those in
Table 2, even though in the earlier table the retirement age was exogenously set to 60 or 62. By
comparing the figures in Table 5 to those in earlier tables, we can assess whether or not
individuals in particular groups had accurate expectations of their pensions, on average, and also
whether or not these expectations were revised to accurately reflect the reforms that took place.
The comparison between Tables 4 and 5 shows that before the reform private employees were, on
average, overestimating the replacement rate, as were middle-aged workers from all groups with
the exception of male public employees (who, on average, underestimated the replacement rate).
After the reform the overestimation of the replacement rate at the average is common to middle-
aged workers across all employment groups. Group averages, however, hide important within-
group heterogeneity and the literature has shown that expectation errors are related to variables
Table 5
Statutory replacement rate: descriptive statistics
Males Females
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Private employees
Old 71.2 71.5 0.3 67.3 71.5 4.2
Middle-aged 71.2 66.8 −4.4 67.3 62.1 −5.2
Young 67 61.2
Public employees
Old 86.2 80 −6.2 79.2 79.5 0.3
Middle-aged 83.9 69.2 −14.7 76.9 65.4 −11.5
Young 66.2 55.3
Self-employed
Old 71.5 69.9 −1.5 67.8 69.9 2.1
Middle-aged 69.6 49.2 −20.4 62.3 45.2 −17.1
Young 41.1 35.5
The statutory replacement rate is computed on the basis of the relevant pension legislation and of average expected
retirement age for each cell in data drawn from the 1989–2000 SHIW. The pre-reform period is 1989–1991, the post-
reform period is 2000–2002. The “old” have at least 18 years of contributions in 1995, the “middle-aged” less than
18 years of contributions in 1995, the “young” entered the labor market after 1995.
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worker, and the corresponding deviation from the expected rate. We then analyze the distribution
of the expectation error (Figs. 1 and 2) and its determinants in a regression framework (Table 6).
Fig. 1 displays the cross-sectional distribution of the difference between the statutory and
expected replacement rates before and after the reform (1989–1991 and 2000–2002,
respectively). On average, expectation errors are small: workers overestimate the replacement
rate by 3.1 percentage points before the reform, and 3.5 percentage points after. But for some
workers expectation errors are large: for about 14% of the sample expectation errors are largerFig. 1. Expectation error distribution before and after the pension reforms. Note: the figure plots the expectation error in the
pre-reform (1989–1991) and post-reform (2000–2002) regimes. The expectation error is defined as the difference between
the expected replacement rate and the statutory replacement rate.
Fig. 2. Expectation error distribution before and after the pension reforms, by employment groups. Note: the figure plots
the expectation error in the pre-reform (1989–1991) and post-reform (2000–2002) regimes for three employment groups.
The expectation error is defined as the difference between the expected replacement rate and the statutory replacement rate.
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reform (19% and 9% of the sample, respectively). Fig. 1 shows also that the distribution of
expectation errors fans out after the reform, which we interpret as an indication that the reform
has increased uncertainty about retirement rules, at least temporarily. Indeed, the standardTable 6
Regressions for the expectation error in the replacement rate
Absolute expectation error Probability of errors greater than 25
percentage points: marginal effects
Males Females Males Females
Age −0.083 (0.017)⁎⁎ −0.111 (0.024)⁎⁎ −0.002 (0.000)⁎⁎ −0.003 (0.001)⁎⁎
Public employee −0.645 (0.302)⁎ −1.137 (0.384)⁎⁎ −0.004 (0.009) −0.012 (0.012)
Self-employed 3.794 (0.313)⁎⁎ 3.170 (0.512)⁎⁎ 0.084 (0.010)⁎⁎ 0.086 (0.017)⁎⁎
Retired household member −3.010 (0.865)⁎⁎ −3.213 (1.118)⁎⁎ −0.091 (0.026)⁎⁎ −0.072 (0.034)⁎
Multiple earners −0.642 (0.274)⁎ −0.805 (0.524) −0.018 (0.008)⁎ −0.018 (0.016)
Age at the first job 0.239 (0.058)⁎⁎ 0.575 (0.055)⁎⁎ 0.008 (0.001)⁎⁎ 0.015 (0.001)⁎⁎
Central Italy 0.584 (0.325) 0.824 (0.423) 0.014 (0.010) 0.017 (0.013)
Southern Italy 1.156 (0.290)⁎⁎ 0.954 (0.422)⁎ 0.034 (0.009)⁎⁎ 0.023 (0.013)
Income 0.012 (0.014) −0.015 (0.028) 0.000 (0.000) −0.001 (0.001)
High school degree −0.207 (0.273) −0.787 (0.389)⁎ −0.011 (0.008) −0.028 (0.012)⁎
College degree 0.553 (0.510) −0.844 (0.584) 0.007 (0.014) −0.009 (0.016)
Post-reform 2.523 (0.252)⁎⁎ 2.429 (0.358)⁎⁎ 0.085 (0.007)⁎⁎ 0.084 (0.010)⁎⁎
Constant 9.696 (1.320)⁎⁎ 6.350 (1.462)⁎⁎
Observations 9186 5519 9186 5519
The expectation error is the difference between the expected and the statutory replacement rate. The latter is computed on
the basis of the relevant pension legislation and the individual's expected retirement age. The first two columns report OLS
estimates of the absolute value of the expectation error. The third and fourth columns report marginal effects of a probit
where the dependent variable equals one if the expectation error is larger than 25 percentage points. Data are drawn from
1989–1991 (pre-reform) and 2000–2002 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two stars
indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level.
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percentage points.
The unconditional distribution of expectation errors conceals group differences, as shown in
Fig. 2. Examination of the pattern for private employees confirms that this group tends to
overestimate the replacement rate before the reform but also that after the reform many more
individuals underestimate the replacement rate and that some make much bigger errors than they
did before the reform. Public employees before the reform make small expectation errors on
average but more than 50% of individuals either overestimate or underestimate the replacement
rate by more than 10 percentage points; the fraction of public employees who overestimate the
replacement rate increases after the reform. The post-reform period features an increase in the
standard deviation of the expectation error for all occupation groups, and the increase is larger for
private employees (from 13 to 18 percentage points) and self-employed (from 17 to 24 percentage
points) than for public employees (from 15 to 18 percentage points). Furthermore, the fraction of
respondents that overestimates or underestimates the replacement rates by at least 25 percentage
points increases for all groups, and particularly for those most affected by the reform (from 10%
to 14% for private employees, from 10% to 16% for public employees, and from 11% to 29% for
the self-employed).
To explore the determinants of understanding about pension outcomes, we define two
measures of misinformation: the absolute value of the expectation error, and a dummy variable
equal to one if the respondent overestimates or underestimates the replacement rate by more than
25 percentage points.9 In Table 6 we relate both indicators to a set of demographics and economic
variables designed to control for the costs and the incentives to acquire and process information
on retirement matters. We report separate regressions for males and females.
In the first two regressions the age coefficient is negative, confirming Gustman and
Steinmeier's (2005) finding that workers closer to retirement are able to perform better pension
calculations. Errors are lower for public employees, possibly because this is a highly unionized
sector. Given the close link between earnings and replacement rates, income risk might be
associated with higher expectation errors. Indeed, we find that the coefficients of “self-employed”
and “resident in the South”, two variables related to income risk, are negative.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) highlight the importance of acquiring information through
relatives and friends, and indeed the presence of a retired person in the household is associated
with lower expectation errors. Word of mouth is also likely to be more effective for those living in
households with multiple earners, accounting for the negative association between multiple
earners and misinformation. As in Mitchell (1988), we find that expectation errors are positively
related with age of entry into the labor market: other things equal, less experienced workers form
less accurate expectations. Finally, the regressions in Table 6 confirm that expectation errors
increase after the reform, which is consistent with the descriptive analysis and the intuition that
the reform is associated with greater uncertainty.
The probit for whether workers overestimate or underestimate the replacement rate by more
than 25 percentage points delivers similar results. Large mistakes increase after the reform by 8%,
and are negatively associated with respondent's age. Furthermore, mistakes are lower for those
living with a retired relative or in a multiple earner household.
Overall, the descriptive and regression analysis suggests that, on average, expectation errors
are in the range of 3% before and after the reform, and that pension information improves as
people approach retirement or when they can learn from peers or from those who are already9 As a robustness check we use squared expectation errors as the dependent variable. The results are unchanged.
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particularly for the groups affected by the reform.
3.3. Difference-in-difference estimates
To gain further insights into the process of expectation formation, we exploit a unique feature
of our data, which is that pension expectations are elicited before and after a period of intense
reforms. This allows us to use a difference-in-difference framework to study how expected
retirement age and expected replacement rate have been affected by the pension reforms. As with
other studies that use a quasi-experimental framework, our tests rely on the assumptions that the
pension reform is exogenous with respect to individual decisions–in particular, with respect to
retirement age–and changes in sample composition.
As far as the first assumption is concerned, we believe that the possible endogeneity of the
reform can be safely ruled out. The reform was not implemented in order to offset different paths
of retirement ages by different cohorts or employment groups. Rather, the 1992 reform was part of
a major deficit-reduction package, prompted by a severe political crisis coupled with the dramatic
devaluation of the lira; it was closely followed by the deepest recession of the post-war era. The
1995 and 1997 reforms were prompted by the huge projected deficits of the social security system
and the attempt to meet the Maastricht criteria.
The second assumption posits that shifts in sample composition are exogenous with respect to
pension expectations. Cohorts and gender are obviously determined at birth. As far as
employment groups are concerned, we require that mobility across various sectors (for instance,
from public to private employment or self-employment) are independent of pension expectations,
i.e. that workers did not switch jobs as a result of the pension reform itself. Since the SHIW has a
rotating panel component, we can check the validity of this assumption by computing the
transition rates across the three employment groups between each pair of adjacent survey years
from 1989 to 2002; Appendix A (available in the online version) reports the transition rates for
1989–1991 and 2000–2002. We find that, in each period, the probability of not changing sector is
about 90% for each of the three groups. Furthermore, we do not reject the hypothesis that the
degree of sector mobility is the same before and after the reform for each of the estimated
transition matrices.10 Although we cannot test directly the hypothesis that workers did not change
sector as a consequence of the reform, we take this as indirect evidence that the pension reform
has not changed the overall pattern of workers' mobility across sectors.
We can identify the effect of the reform on expected retirement age and replacement rate
because there is one group of individuals (old private employees) that was unaffected by the
reform, while other groups (public employees, self-employed, the young and the middle-aged)
were affected and should have revised their expectations downward. Therefore to disentangle the
effect of the reforms on expectations from other effects, such as common trends in determinants of
labor supply and business cycle effects, we compare the difference over time in the replacement
rate of the middle-aged with the same difference for the old. Our approach does not require panel
data. What we need to observe is a representative sample of the various groups in each of the two10 As an example, consider the Shorrocks mobility index in 1989–1991 (12.5%) and 2000–2002 (13%). The statistical
test does not reject the hypothesis that mobility is the same in the two periods (the associated statistic is 0.12 and is
normally distributed with mean zero and variance equal to one). The same test can be performed for each of the transition
matrices (1991–1993, 1993–1995, 1995–1998, 1998–2000), and in all cases we do not reject the hypothesis that
mobility is constant.
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the effect of the reform because they entered the labor market after 1995. Since they were sampled
only after the reform was in place, they are dropped from the analysis.
We pool all data from pre- and post-reform periods and specify a reduced form for the expected
retirement age and replacement rate; we denote by y the relevant variable of interest. We assume
that before the reform y is a linear function of socio-demographic variables X, employment status
(private, public, self-employed) and depends on whether the years of contributions as of 1995 are
more or less than 18:
yi ¼ Xibþ a1 þ a2PUBi þ a3SELFi þ d1Mi þ d2Mi⁎PUBi þ d3Mi⁎SELFi þ ei ð1Þ
The reference group in the regression equation is the group of old, private employees; the
dummy variable M equals 1 for the middle-aged (less than 18 years of contributions as of 1995).
The α coefficients capture the different rules applying to public employees (PUB) and self-
employed (SELF) relative to private employees, whereas the δ coefficients measure the potential
differences between middle-aged and old of the three employment groups.
After the reform y potentially shifts for all groups, so we augment the previous equation with
terms that interact the cohort (M), the post-reform period (POST, where POST equals one for the
post-reform period) and the employment status (SELF, PUB):
yi ¼ Xibþ a1 þ a2PUBi þ a3SELFi þ d1Mi þ d2Mi⁎PUBi þ d3Mi⁎SELFi
þ /1POSTi þ /2POSTi⁎PUBi þ /3POSTi⁎SELFi þ g1POSTi⁎Mi⁎PRIVi
þ g2POSTi⁎Mi⁎PUBi þ g3POSTi⁎Mi⁎SELFi þ ei ð2Þ
The ϕ coefficients capture the change in y after the reform for the three employment groups: ϕ1
measures the change for old private employees and ϕ2 and ϕ3 the additional effects for public
employees and self-employed. The γ coefficients measure the change in y for the middle-aged due
to the reform, and are our main parameters of interest. We expect the reform to increase retirement
age and to reduce the replacement rate, and that this effect should be largest for public employees
and for the self-employed, as shown in Section 2. The model is estimated separately for males and
females, omitting the transitional 1993–1997 period.
Table 7 reports the results for expected retirement age. In the first specification we drop the
control vector X, and regress expected retirement age on a set of group dummies. The results
indicate that after the reform expected retirement age increases for all middle-aged workers, and
particularly for public employees (1.449) and self-employed (1.475).
The second regression adds to the basic specification regional and educational dummies and
annual earnings (in thousand Euro). We find that expected retirement age is considerably higher in
the South (the coefficient is 1.682) and for workers with a college degree (2.971 years).11 On the
other hand, each thousand Euro of income reduces expected retirement age by 0.015 years. The
two regressions for females in Table 7 confirm most of the patterns found for males, though the
effects for middle-aged females are somewhat larger, particularly for self-employed, who raise
their retirement age by around 2 years.
Table 8 focuses on the expected replacement rate. We find a 4 percentage point reduction in the
replacement rate for middle-aged private employees and self-employed after the reform, and a 2
percentage point reduction for middle-aged public employees. If we use the statutory replacement11 The positive effect of the dummy for the South is likely to arise from the fact that workers in the South enter the labor
market later than in other parts of the country, and therefore qualify later for a pension.
Table 7
The effect of the pension reform on the expected retirement age: regression results
Males Females
Private employee, middle-aged,
after the reform
0.686 (0.277)⁎ 0.575 (0.269)⁎ 0.704 (0.412) 0.689 (0.405)
Public employee, middle-aged,
after the reform
1.449 (0.392)⁎⁎ 1.091 (0.381)⁎⁎ 1.110 (0.387)⁎⁎ 0.875 (0.380)⁎
Self-employed, middle-aged,
after the reform
1.475 (0.437)⁎⁎ 1.572 (0.424)⁎⁎ 2.285 (0.690)⁎⁎ 2.353 (0.678)⁎⁎
Public employee 0.605 (0.202)⁎⁎ −0.003 (0.197) 1.112 (0.278)⁎⁎ 0.302 (0.280)
Self-employed 3.257 (0.243)⁎⁎ 3.152 (0.237)⁎⁎ 3.283 (0.410)⁎⁎ 3.180 (0.403)⁎⁎
Middle-aged 0.953 (0.198)⁎⁎ 0.868 (0.193)⁎⁎ 0.670 (0.297)⁎ 0.513 (0.293)
Public employee, middle-aged −0.818 (0.333)⁎ −0.925 (0.323)⁎⁎ −0.849 (0.402)⁎ −0.663 (0.395)
Self-employed, middle-aged −1.459 (0.388)⁎⁎ −1.873 (0.377)⁎⁎ −1.650 (0.603)⁎⁎ −1.922 (0.593)⁎⁎
Post-reform 1.887 (0.207)⁎⁎ 2.084 (0.201)⁎⁎ 3.017 (0.328)⁎⁎ 3.073 (0.322)⁎⁎
Public employee, after the reform −0.659 (0.354) −0.524 (0.343) −0.029 (0.443) 0.235 (0.435)
Self-employed, after the reform −0.857 (0.381)⁎ −0.882 (0.370)⁎ −1.621 (0.612)⁎⁎ −1.628 (0.602)⁎⁎
Central Italy 0.513 (0.121)⁎⁎ 0.653 (0.151)⁎⁎
Southern Italy 1.682 (0.104)⁎⁎ 1.536 (0.149)⁎⁎
Earnings −0.015 (0.005)⁎⁎ −0.006 (0.010)
High school degree 1.177 (0.100)⁎⁎ 0.540 (0.139)⁎⁎
University school degree 2.971 (0.163)⁎⁎ 1.976 (0.201)⁎⁎
Constant 58.804 (0.123)⁎⁎ 57.801 (0.157)⁎⁎ 55.740 (0.213)⁎⁎ 55.128 (0.252)⁎⁎
Observations 9724 9724 5925 5925
R-squared 0.12 0.17 0.15 0.18
The dependent variable is the expected retirement age. The regressions are estimated by OLS. Data are drawn from 1989–
1991 (pre-reform) and 2000–2002 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two stars indicate
statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level.
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reform, for the middle-aged in relation to the old, should be of 4.7 for private employees, 8.5 for
public employees and 18.9 for the self-employed, suggesting that only private employees change
their expected replacement rates as required by the reform. The second regression adds to the
basic specification regional and educational dummies and annual earnings (in thousand Euro).
Working in the South and the level of income are positively related to the replacement rate. The
effect of the education dummies is positive, although university degree is not statistically different
from zero for males.
The regressions for females uncover an across-the-board reduction in the replacement rate after
the reform, but the employment dummies interacted with the M and POST dummies signal no
differential effect by employment groups or cohort after the reform. The corresponding
coefficients are not statistically different from zero, while Table 5 implies a large reduction in the
replacement rate for each employment group.
In summary, the regressions suggest that most groups have revised their expectations in the
direction implied by the reform. But the revision to the new pension rules has been far from
complete. Two interpretations of the results are possible: an anticipation effect, or lack of
information. If the reform had been anticipated, people would have adjusted downward the
expected replacement rate (and upward the retirement age) even before the reform. This
explanation clashes with the fact that, on average, the 1989–1991 expected replacement rates
were quite close to–or even overestimated–the statutory rates. Furthermore, the distribution of
expectation errors before the reform (grey histograms in Fig. 2) shows that in all employment
Table 8
The effect of the reform on the expected replacement rate: regression results
Males Females
Private employee, middle-aged,
after the reform
−4.143 (0.962)⁎⁎ −4.299 (0.960)⁎⁎ −0.825 (1.430) −0.904 (1.421)
Public employee, middle-aged,
after the reform
−2.032 (1.361) −2.350 (1.360) −1.211 (1.341) −1.412 (1.335)
Self-employed, middle-aged,
after the reform
−4.283 (1.516)⁎⁎ −4.536 (1.513)⁎⁎ −2.805 (2.393) −2.830 (2.379)
Public employee 2.650 (0.699)⁎⁎ 2.389 (0.704)⁎⁎ 1.070 (0.963) −0.372 (0.981)
Self-employed −10.170 (0.844)⁎⁎ −10.488 (0.844)⁎⁎ −11.878 (1.421)⁎⁎ −12.040 (1.416)⁎⁎
Middle-aged 0.051 (0.686) 0.353 (0.688) −0.314 (1.030) −0.463 (1.029)
Public employee, middle-aged −1.313 (1.155) −1.418 (1.152) 0.337 (1.393) 0.603 (1.385)
Self-employed, middle-aged 2.057 (1.348) 1.847 (1.346) 4.657 (2.093)⁎ 4.076 (2.081)
Post-reform −4.298 (0.717)⁎⁎ −4.139 (0.717)⁎⁎ −6.088 (1.137)⁎⁎ −5.927 (1.130)⁎⁎
Public employee, after the reform 2.365 (1.228) 2.461 (1.225)⁎ 1.805 (1.535) 2.244 (1.527)
Self-employed, after the reform −3.508 (1.320)⁎⁎ −3.409 (1.319)⁎⁎ −1.895 (2.124) −1.876 (2.113)
Central Italy 0.548 (0.433) 0.283 (0.531)
Southern Italy 1.114 (0.371)⁎⁎ 2.445 (0.522)⁎⁎
Earnings 0.099 (0.017)⁎⁎ 0.185 (0.033)⁎⁎
High school degree 0.950 (0.355)⁎⁎ 2.024 (0.487)⁎⁎
University school degree 0.142 (0.583) 1.727 (0.706)⁎
Constant 79.191 (0.427)⁎⁎ 76.604 (0.562)⁎⁎ 77.192 (0.739)⁎⁎ 73.468 (0.884)⁎⁎
Observations 9724 9724 5925 5925
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.12
The dependent variable is the expected replacement rate. The regressions are estimated by OLS. Data are drawn from
1989–1991 (pre-reform) and 2000–2002 (post-reform) SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two stars
indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level.
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public employees, whose distribution is centered around zero, and for whom, therefore, looking at
the whole distribution rather than at the mean is particularly important. Finally, the anticipation
effect should be stronger in the years immediately before the reform; however, dropping 1991 and
defining the pre-reform period as just 1989 does not change the results with respect to estimates in
Table 8. Therefore, the most likely explanation for our findings is that, as of 2002, many workers
did not fully understand the implications of the new pension regime and had not yet updated their
pension expectations accordingly.
4. The offset between pension wealth and private wealth accumulation
The analysis presented in the previous section suggests that people reacted to the pension
reform by raising expectations of retirement age and reducing perceived replacement rates (and
therefore expected pension wealth). However, the magnitude of the expectation revision is
considerably lower than the actual magnitudes implied by the reform. This is an important first
step in evaluating the effect of pension reforms on individual behavior. The next step relates
perceived pension wealth to private accumulation, accounting for the different degree of workers'
information. We use the expectation error in social security wealth as an index of the workers'
knowledge of their pension entitlements and to identify two groups in the sample, which we will
call “informed” and “uninformed” workers. Accordingly, in this section we estimate the offset for
the whole sample and also for the informed and uniformed workers samples.
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to income) and to a set of observable variables potentially correlated with private wealth. This is
different from Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) who model the response of the change in private
wealth relative to income (the saving rate) to the level of pension wealth relative to income. This
amounts to assuming that saving changes permanently when social security wealth changes. Our
specification implicitly posits that the saving effect is temporary, aiming to estimate the change in
the stock of private wealth after the change in expected pension wealth induced by the reforms.
More specifically, we estimate the following equation:
WYit ¼ aþ SSWYitdþ Xitgþ ht þ eit ð3Þ
where WYit is private wealth of household i at time t, scaled by household disposable income,
SSWYit is the ratio of expected pension wealth retirement (evaluated at time t) to earnings, Xit is a
vector that includes age of the household head,12 disposable income, year dummies, education
dummies, and region dummies;13 θt represents time effects. Age, income, and education are
proxies for lifetime earnings, while year dummies capture macroeconomic effects. Private wealth
is defined as financial assets plus real assets (real estates and businesses) minus financial debt.
4.1. The construction of pension wealth
We calculate the ratio of expected pension wealth (at retirement) to earnings (evaluated at time
t) in a way that keeps the computation as simple as possible while being tailored to the inclusion
of elicited expectations of the replacement rate and the retirement age. To do this, we use the
following proxy for each worker's pension wealth-to-income ratio:
SSWYt ¼ P Ntjtð Þ 1þ gu1þ r
 Nt−t
rt
" #XT
s¼Nt
P sjNtð Þ 1þ gN1þ r
 s−Nt
ð4Þ
where σt is the expected replacement rate and Nt is the expected retirement age elicited at time t,
14
T is the maximum length of life, p(τ|N) is the probability of surviving to age τ, conditional on
being alive at age N, gu is the growth rate of earnings for group u, r is the real interest rate, and gN
is the growth rate of pension benefits during retirement—assumed to be the same for all groups.
In the survey we observe σt and Nt for each individual. In the empirical estimates we will check
the sensitivity of the results with respect to the assumption of point expectations for Nt, allowing
for some dispersion around the reported expected retirement age. Survival probabilities are taken
from the Italian life tables, by age and gender, for the years 1990 and 2000, so that the change in
life expectancy over time, and in particular before and after the reform, is accounted for.15 The
growth rate of earnings (gu) is estimated from our data at 0.015 for individuals with university
degree and at 0.008 for individuals with less than university degree.16 We assume that after
retirement pensions are constant in real terms (gN=0) and that the real interest rate is equal to 2%.12 We define the head of the household as the partner with higher earnings.
13 In the regressions, the reference group is private employees with less than 13 years of education and living in
Northern Italy.
14 t is equal to 1989, 1991, 2000, 2002, the survey years in which the expected replacement rate is elicited.
15 Data source: Italian Statistical Annex (Rome: ISTAT, 1990 and 2000).
16 The growth rates were obtained from a median regression of log-earnings on sex and employment dummies and full
interaction of age with a college dummy. Data source: SHIW, years 1989–2002, individuals with age 20–60.
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for each individual in the sample. In households with more than one member, we define the
household expected pension wealth-to-income ratio at retirement as the weighted sum of both
partners' expected pension wealth-to-income ratio.17
The individual expected pension wealth-to-income ratio is adjusted by the factor suggested by
Gale (1998). This factor rescales the expected pension wealth and depends on the number of years
people have contributed to their pension plan as well as for when in their life cycle they have
experienced some shock that should have made them revise their consumption and savings plans
(the reforms, in our case). Omitting to adjust for this factor would produce an underestimate of the
offset between pension wealth and private wealth, i.e. the estimates for the pension wealth
coefficient would be biased towards zero. The adjustment depends on the utility function that is
chosen for the underlying life-cycle model and on the values for the discount rate, the interest rate
and the time preference rate. We use the adjustment developed in Gale (1998) for the constant
relative risk aversion utility function and set the discount rate and the interest rate equal to 2%;
details are reported in Appendix A (available in the online version).
4.2. Regression estimates
Table 9 presents OLS estimates of the relation between pension wealth and private wealth.
OLS estimates are inefficient if the disturbance term is heteroskedastic. Standard errors are
therefore corrected using the White's (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix
estimator. The specification relates the private wealth–income ratio to pension wealth, time
dummies, age, employment dummies, a dummy for middle-aged, employment dummies
interacted with the middle-aged dummies and with time dummies, education and regional
dummies and income.
The key coefficient of interest is the offset between private and pension wealth, which is
−0.286 and statistically different from zero at the 1% level (the standard error is 0.027). The
estimates also indicate that the wealth–income ratio increases with age during the working
lifetime (recall that individuals over 50 are excluded) and with income. The latter should not
affect the wealth–income ratio if preferences are homothetic. The regression coefficient, on
the other hand, can hardly be interpreted as evidence for or against homothetic preferences
since other variables (employment, education or residence in the South) also proxy for
lifetime earnings. Residence in the South reduces wealth accumulation; education has an
opposite effect. These variables are related to household resources, but may also capture other
effects. For instance, there is evidence that the better educated are more likely to report
financial assets (Brandolini and Cannari, 1994); households with higher education may have
easier access to capital markets and to better investment opportunities; thrift may be correlated
with schooling. Finally, the wealth–income ratio for public employees is not statistically
different from that of private employees but the self-employed have a higher wealth–income
ratio.
We then split the sample according to the difference between the statutory and expected
pension wealth–income ratio. In particular, we consider as “Informed” households where the
difference is less than one, in absolute value; the rest of the sample is “Uninformed.”18 The18 The median of the absolute value of the difference between statutory and expected pension wealth is 1.
17 Weights are given by the ratio of each partner's income to the joint income of the couple.
2207R. Bottazzi et al. / Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006) 2187–2212estimated offset for the informed is larger in absolute value (−0.379) than that for the uninformed
(−0.237); both coefficients are statistically different from zero at the 1% level.19
The OLS results might understate the offset between pension wealth and private wealth if
pension wealth and private wealth are positively correlated. This might be the case if thrift and
hard work are correlated tastes, and people with these traits choose to save more and to retire with
higher pension wealth. Since the pension reforms provide us with an exogenous source of
variation for pension wealth, we can perform instrumental variable estimation and remove this
source of bias from our estimates.
We use as instruments the interaction between the three employment dummies, a dummy for
the post-reform period and a dummy for middle-aged. The validity of these instruments rests on
the fact that the rules for computing pension wealth change exogenously for the middle-aged after
the reform, depending on employment group membership. It also depends on the assumption that
the middle-aged did not switch jobs after the reform to offset the impact of the pension reform on
their retirement wealth. Under this reasonable assumption, which is corroborated by the evidence
on employment transition matrices reported in Appendix A (available in the online version), the
instruments are also exogenous with respect to private wealth accumulation decisions. Attanasio
and Brugiavini (2003) use similar employment-group instruments for pension wealth in their
study of the impact of the 1992 Italian pension reform on the household saving rate.
To assess the quality of our instruments we perform the test of the over-identifying restrictions
and the rank test. The Hansen-Sargan test does not reject the over-identifying restrictions: the test
is equal to 0.503 and is distributed as a Chi-square with 2 degrees of freedom (the p-value is 0.77).
We check the rank condition regressing pension wealth on the full set of instruments and testing
the null that the coefficients of the instruments are jointly equal to zero. The F-test rejects this null
at 1% level and implies that the rank condition is satisfied. The results from the instrumental
variables estimation are reported in the last three columns of Table 9. They indicate higher offset
rates between private wealth and pension wealth than in the OLS estimates. The sample splits
deliver again considerably higher offset rates for the informed (−0.81) than for the uninformed
(−0.44).
To check the sensitivity of the results to the assumption of point expectations used to compute
social security wealth, we allow for some dispersion around the point estimate of the expected
retirement age in Eq. (4). We perturb retirement age by adding a draw from a discrete uniform
distribution with zero mean and variance equal to 2. In the IV regressions, the offset rates are
−0.659 (standard error 0.312) in the total sample, and −0.946 and −0.383 in the sample of
informed and uninformed workers, respectively. As a further check, we double the variance and
the results do not change appreciably.20
We perform several other sensitivity tests. The results are not affected if one uses the least
absolute deviations estimator or if one includes other variables, such as family size, number of
income recipients, and a quadratic term in age. We also check the sensitivity of the results with
respect to the particular assumptions used to calculate the Gale adjustment factor (the interest rate,
the discount factor and the coefficient of relative risk-aversion) described in the appendix and find
that adopting an interest rate and a discount rate greater than 2% implies slightly lower offsets.20 The OLS offset coefficients are also similar to those reported in Table 9: −0.228 for the total sample, −0.359 for the
informed, and −0.269 for the uninformed.
19 In a specification including only pension wealth, age and year dummies, the offset between private wealth and
pension wealth is −0.419 (standard error of 0.025). In the sample of informed workers, the offset is −0.547 (standard
error of 0.043); in the sample of uninformed it is −0.347 (standard error of 0.033).
Table 9
The offset between private wealth and pension wealth: OLS and IV estimates
OLS IV
Total sample Informed Uninformed Total sample Informed Uninformed
SSW/disposable income −0.286 (0.027)⁎⁎ −0.379 (0.047)⁎⁎ −0.237 (0.036)⁎⁎ −0.645 (0.303)⁎ −0.810 (0.321)⁎ −0.441 (0.426)
Year 1991 0.732 (0.098)⁎⁎ 0.794 (0.140)⁎⁎ 0.663 (0.137)⁎⁎ 0.736 (0.100)⁎⁎ 0.831 (0.144)⁎⁎ 0.657 (0.138)⁎⁎
Year 2000 0.935 (0.134)⁎⁎ 1.049 (0.190)⁎⁎ 0.881 (0.190)⁎⁎ 0.613 (0.309)⁎ 0.858 (0.247)⁎⁎ 0.642 (0.537)
Year 2002 0.994 (0.140)⁎⁎ 0.924 (0.200)⁎⁎ 1.104 (0.199)⁎⁎ 0.686 (0.300)⁎ 0.747 (0.247)⁎⁎ 0.879 (0.514)
Age 0.083 (0.009)⁎⁎ 0.085 (0.013)⁎⁎ 0.084 (0.012)⁎⁎ 0.109 (0.024)⁎⁎ 0.113 (0.025)⁎⁎ 0.100 (0.036)⁎⁎
Public employee 0.078 (0.113) 0.121 (0.156) 0.038 (0.169) 0.057 (0.119) 0.235 (0.182) −0.004 (0.196)
Self-employed 1.775 (0.194)⁎⁎ 1.866 (0.275)⁎⁎ 1.639 (0.272)⁎⁎ 1.337 (0.421)⁎⁎ 1.566 (0.352)⁎⁎ 1.298 (0.776)
Middle-aged −0.544 (0.149)⁎⁎ −0.688 (0.221)⁎⁎ −0.489 (0.206)⁎ −1.226 (0.580)⁎ −1.385 (0.542)⁎ −0.961 (0.986)
Public employee, middle-aged 0.095 (0.168) 0.101 (0.234) 0.158 (0.247) 0.146 (0.180) 0.056 (0.238) 0.249 (0.331)
Self-employed, middle-aged −0.239 (0.271) 0.095 (0.376) −0.443 (0.399) 0.076 (0.409) 0.345 (0.448) −0.184 (0.700)
Public employee, after the reform 0.194 (0.165) 0.283 (0.225) 0.053 (0.243) 0.205 (0.167) 0.222 (0.235) 0.036 (0.250)
Self-employed, after the reform 0.891 (0.262)⁎⁎ 0.880 (0.369)⁎ 0.943 (0.380)⁎ 0.952 (0.261)⁎⁎ 0.827 (0.375)⁎ 0.982 (0.384)⁎
Central Italy 0.251 (0.103)⁎ 0.269 (0.142) 0.228 (0.150) 0.161 (0.127) 0.166 (0.158) 0.190 (0.169)
Southern Italy −0.032 (0.090) −0.028 (0.128) −0.031 (0.128) −0.125 (0.120) −0.117 (0.143) −0.088 (0.174)
Income 0.019 (0.003)⁎⁎ 0.018 (0.003)⁎⁎ 0.019 (0.004)⁎⁎ 0.014 (0.005)⁎⁎ 0.012 (0.006) 0.017 (0.005)⁎⁎
High school degree 0.613 (0.087)⁎⁎ 0.823 (0.121)⁎⁎ 0.405 (0.125)⁎⁎ 0.631 (0.089)⁎⁎ 0.871 (0.128)⁎⁎ 0.397 (0.125)⁎⁎
College degree 0.605 (0.131)⁎⁎ 0.781 (0.186)⁎⁎ 0.499 (0.184)⁎⁎ 0.627 (0.131)⁎⁎ 0.872 (0.196)⁎⁎ 0.460 (0.201)⁎
Constant −0.378 (0.360) −0.295 (0.537) −0.427 (0.484) 0.268 (0.635) 0.203 (0.636) 0.012 (1.017)
Observations 9315 4687 4628 9315 4687 4628
R-squared 0.14 0.16 0.13
The dependent variable is the wealth–income ratio. Informed and uninformed individuals are defined on the basis of the difference in expected and statutory pension wealth–income
ratio (SSWY). We define as “Informed” someone who reports an absolute difference between SSWY constructed with the expected replacement rate and SSWY constructed with
the statutory rate less than 1, and “Uninformed” those with a difference greater than 1, in absolute value. Data are drawn from 1989–1991 (pre-reform) and 2000–2002 (post-reform)
SHIW. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Two stars indicate statistical significance at the 1% confidence level; one star at the 5% level.
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Using SHIW data for the years 1989–95, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) exploit the changes
in pension wealth across cohorts and employment groups due to the 1992 pension reform in order
to estimate the crowding out effect of pension wealth. They model the response of the change in
private wealth relative to income (the household saving rate) to the level of social security wealth
relative to income. This amounts to assuming that saving changes permanently when social
security wealth changes. In the long run, this implies a very large effect of a pension reform on
private wealth.
Attanasio and Brugiavini conduct a miniature policy experiment to show that if a pension
reform reduces social security wealth for a “typical” individual by 10% of its initial value
(about 3 years of income according to Attanasio-Brugiavini, Table II, p. 1096), the first year
after the reform the private saving rate of this individual increases by 4.4 percentage points
(from 4.2% to 8.6%). Since according to their estimates different age-groups and different
individuals respond differently to the pension reform, this result cannot be generalized to the
entire sample or to the population at large. In the long run, given their specification, the
estimated offset coefficients between social security wealth and private wealth do not provide
a round number for the effects of the 1992 pension reform on the change in aggregate
saving, wealth and the capital stock.21
In this paper we relate the level of private wealth (relative to income) to the level of social
security wealth (relative to income). The results can be used to estimate the change in the stock of
private wealth when households have fully adjusted to the new pension regime after the three
reforms (1992, 1995 and 1997). We rely on a measure of pension wealth based on the expected
retirement age and expected replacement rate, rather than computed from legislation, and estimate
the offset between pension wealth and discretionary wealth according to the accuracy of workers'
information about pension arrangements. The regressions show that workers whose expectations
are closer to the statutory levels (“Informed”) have larger offsets.22 To the extent that in the long-
run expectations adjust fully to the new pension regime, the estimates for the informed measure
the long-run impact of the reform on discretionary wealth.
To provide a sense of the magnitudes involved, we compute the pension wealth for a male
belonging to the so-called middle-aged group, with 13 years of education (i.e. a non-university
graduate), who expects to retire at age 62. Table 10 reports pension wealth for such an individual
conditional on being a private or a public employee, or self-employed, and in both pre- and post-
reform regimes. After the reform pension wealth falls for each employment group, and the
reduction is larger for public employees and the self-employed. According to our estimates, the21 For Italy, three earlier studies sought to evaluate the degree of substitution between social security and private wealth.
Brugiavini (1987), using data from the 1984 SHIW, finds a rather small substitution (around 10%) between social
security and private wealth accumulation. Jappelli (1995) finds an offset coefficient around 20% in the 1989–1991
SHIW. Rossi and Visco (1994), using aggregate time series, estimate that social security wealth offsets private wealth by
21% (32% using an instrumental variables procedure), concluding that the development of a generous social security
system explains about one fourth of the 7.2 percentage-point decline in the Italian private saving rate between 1962–1972
and 1980–1990.
22 If we estimated the offset between pension wealth and discretionary wealth using the statutory pension wealth–
income ratio (in a similar fashion to previous studies), the OLS coefficient would be −0.38 (significant at 1% level),
which is close to what we find for the informed group but much higher than the offset that we estimate for the uninformed
(−0.24).
Table 10
Change in the wealth–income ratio for informed and uninformed workers and employment groups
Pension wealth–income ratio Changes in private wealth–income ratio
Pre-reform Post-reform Difference Informed Uninformed
Private employees 11.0 9.9 −1.1 0.9 0.3
Public employees 13.4 10.3 −3.1 2.5 1.0
Self-employed 10.5 7.0 −3.5 2.8 1.1
In the pre-reform case, pension wealth is computed for a male worker, without college degree, who expects to retire at age
62 and to contribute 37 years (10 years before 1995 and 27 after). In the post-reform case, the replacement rate is based on
the assumptions that the growth rates of earnings and GDP are 2% and 1.5% per year, respectively. The change in the
private wealth–income ratio for informed workers assumes that expected SSWY (the pension wealth–income ratio) equals
statutory SSWY, i.e. that they perceive the full change in pension wealth, and that the offset coefficient is −0.810, as in the
IV estimates of Table 9; the change in the private wealth–income ratio for uninformed workers assumes that this group
only perceives 70% of the change in pension wealth and that the offset coefficient is −0.441, as in the IV estimates of
Table 9.
2210 R. Bottazzi et al. / Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006) 2187–2212reduction in pension wealth prompts an increase in private wealth.23 If we use the IV estimated
offsets in Table 9,24 then under the assumption that informed workers perceive the entire
reduction in pension wealth, the private wealth-to-income ratio increases by 0.9 for private
employees, 2.5 for public employees and 2.8 for self-employed.25
The drawback of our static specification, of course, is that we cannot estimate how saving
changes during the adjustment process that follows the pension reform. But our data indicate that
private wealth adjusts slowly, since many workers do not perceive the full change in social
security wealth. Furthermore, our estimated coefficient for the uninformed means that for a large
portion of the working population there is far from full crowding out of private accumulation
several years after the pension reform. This makes the question of whether the uninformed are
saving enough for their retirement of central interest.
5. Conclusions
The Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a large representative sample of the Italian
population, elicits expectations of replacement rates from workers interviewed in the years
between 1989 and 2002, a period of intense pension reforms. The reforms reduced replacement
rates and increased retirement ages, and had different impacts on different cohorts and
employment groups. This exogenous variation in replacement rates allows us to study the effect
of pension reforms on expectations, and how changes in expected social security wealth were
reflected in private wealth accumulation decisions.
We find that pension reforms indeed affected expectations of retirement benefits.
However, the revision in expectations is limited, and many individuals have still not23 If uninformed workers perceive only 70% of the reduction in pension wealth, the private wealth-income ratio
increases by only 0.3 for private employees, 1.0 for public employees, and 1.1 for self-employed.
24 These coefficients are −0.810 for the informed and −0.441 for the uninformed.
25 Comparing the change in the statutory to the expected pension wealth–income ratio reveals that, among the middle
aged, the informed have perceived almost fully the reduction in the pension wealth–income ratio, and the uninformed
have perceived only about 70% of the reduction in the statutory ratio. On average, for the informed the difference
between the statutory pension wealth–income ratio before and after the reform is −1.28; the difference in the expected
counterparts is −1.27. For the uninformed the corresponding differences are −3.64 and −2.54.
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the self-employed falls by about 10 percentage points between 1989–1991 and 2000–2002,
in reality the rate falls by about 20 points. Moreover, the offset between pension wealth and
expected private wealth is only partial, in the order of 30% in the total sample (60% in the
IV estimation). Most importantly, the offset coefficient is higher for people that are more
informed about their future benefits. Once expectations adjust fully to the new rules, the
offset between private wealth and pension wealth is likely to be higher. This suggests that
the effect of pension reform depends critically on the extent of the knowledge and
information that individuals have about the social security system and changes to it, and has
three important policy implications.
First, the descriptive and econometric analysis implies that some workers lack information to
fully understand pension rules, thus making a case for investing public resources in the
dissemination of information about pension rights, especially during periods of intense reform.
Campaigns to increase financial literacy and the understanding of pension rules, and to provide
individuals with regular statements of their expected retirement income, are important steps in
this direction.26 Second, the paper suggests that if one wants to use observations of past
pension reforms to make predictions about likely responses to new reforms, then one needs to
estimate how responses in the past were limited by inaccurate updating of expectations, and
how the new reform will affect expectations. Finally, given the dramatic reduction in
replacement rates implied by the pension reform, combined with an incomplete offset between
pension wealth and private wealth, it is likely that some individuals, especially the younger
cohorts most affected by the reform, might not be saving enough for their old age. This might
have a long-term impact on the well being of future retirees in the coming decades, when the
generations affected by the pension reform will start to retire.
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